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Identity Attacks Overtake Exploits as Top Ransomware Cause
THREAT RESEARCH NEWS

Identity Attacks Overtake Exploits as Top Ransomware Cause

3 min read Daniel A. & Óscar S.

Email attacks have overtaken software exploits as the leading root cause of ransomware incidents, according to newly published research. The most uncomfortable number in the report: multifactor authentication was deployed in 97% of credential-based attacks: and the victims were compromised anyway.

Why it matters

For years the reflex answer to account takeover has been "turn on MFA". This data says attackers have adapted: the fight has moved from whether you have a second factor to which kind and how it can be bypassed. A push notification a tired employee approves at 2 a.m., or a phishing page that silently proxies the whole login – session token included – defeats conventional MFA without ever cracking it.

It also reframes patching priorities. Exploited vulnerabilities still matter, but if the front door for most ransomware is now a mailbox and a stolen login, an identity-hardening hour probably buys more risk reduction than another scanner cycle.

What actually moves the needle

  • Phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2 security keys, passkeys) for admins and finance first – these bind authentication to the real site and can’t be relayed by a proxy page.
  • Conditional access: block legacy protocols, require managed devices for sensitive apps, and alert on impossible-travel sign-ins.
  • Treat identity telemetry as detection gold: new MFA device enrolments, mailbox rule creation and consent grants are early ransomware indicators, not IT noise.

If you're building out detection around this, our explainer on how a SOC turns signals into response covers where these alerts should land.

Identity is the new perimeter

Step back from the individual numbers and the report describes a structural shift the industry has been circling for years: the network edge is no longer where attacks are won or lost – the login is. As workloads moved to SaaS and remote access became the norm, the firewall stopped being the thing standing between an attacker and your data. A valid session token now does what a network foothold used to, and it arrives through a mailbox rather than an exploit.

That reframes what "defense in depth" should mean in 2026. The layers worth investing in are increasingly identity-centric: strong, phishing-resistant authentication, tight control over who can grant application consent, and monitoring that treats identity events as security telemetry rather than help-desk noise. Organizations still spending disproportionately on perimeter tooling while treating identity as an IT convenience are defending the wrong door, and the attackers, this data suggests, already know which door that is.

Source

This is our own summary and analysis. The original reporting is at darkreading.com →

Frequently asked questions

Does this mean MFA is useless?
No: it means conventional push or code-based MFA is no longer sufficient against phishing kits that proxy logins or bombard users with prompts. Phishing-resistant factors like FIDO2 keys and passkeys bind the login to the legitimate site and still hold up.
Why did email overtake exploits as the top cause?
Exploiting software requires a vulnerable, reachable system; phishing only requires a person. As patch cycles improved and exploit prices rose, stolen credentials became the cheaper, more reliable way in, and they blend into normal traffic once used.
What are early warning signs of a credential-based intrusion?
Sign-ins from unusual locations or impossible travel, sudden MFA device enrolments, new mailbox forwarding rules, and OAuth consent grants nobody remembers. Those events deserve alerting on par with malware detections.
Who writes this

Daniel A. and Óscar S. run Breachfolio, a small independent site about security and AI. This article was drafted with AI assistance and reviewed by a person before it went live. We write from documentation, vendor sources and published research rather than from original lab benchmarks, and we link a source in the sentence that relies on it. How we work · About us